November 14, 2009

Indian Defence Industry Poised to Grow

The major highlight of recent amendments to the Defence Procurement Procedure 2008 (DPP 2008) is that of encouraging the domestic industry to actively participate in defence production. The encouragement assumes greater importance considering the “shameful and dangerous” aspect of India’s self-reliance in defence production. As a matter of fact, despite the 50 year-stated goal of achieving 70 per cent self sufficiency in defence equipment production, less than half of it has so far been achieved, resulting in annual outflow of a significant amount of foreign currency and potential vulnerability in terms of critical dependence on others in crisis situations. It is this undesirable state of affairs that the current modifications in the rules of engagement, as brought out in amended DPP 2008, have tried to reverse and, in turn, make India “truly a world class” defence manufacturing nation. These amendments, which came into effect on November 01, 2009, need careful analysis to see how they would impact on India’s defence industrial base.


The first and foremost amendment with respect to development of an advanced indigenous defence industry relates to the way the Ministry of Defence (MoD) procures defence capital equipments/platforms, worth billons of dollars each year (approximately $8.5 billion in 2008-09). Until now, all the procurements were categorised under three broad headings: ‘Buy’, ‘Buy and Make’ and ‘Make’. The first one has little to contribute towards indigenous industrial efforts, as most of the advanced items under this category are in the form of direct import without any involvement of the domestic industry. The latter two have however direct bearings, with the last being the harbinger of India’s progress towards the manufacture of high technology complex weapons systems, albeit through a rigorous and expensive research and development (R&D) efforts. Under the ‘Buy & Make’ category, the government imports some numbers and the remainder is manufactured within India, with the MoD negotiating with foreign vendors for transfer of technology to an approved Indian agency for production. The middle path not only saves time in terms of doing away with time-consuming and costly R&D efforts but also ensures self-reliance through indigenous production of foreign technology. It also provides opportunities for Indian companies to form partnerships with foreign companies.

Good intentions notwithstanding, the ‘Buy & Make’ has procedure proved to be a very difficult proposition. It is primarily because of greater involvement of the MoD in finalising technology transfer agreements with foreign companies, which should have ideally been left to the domestic production agencies to negotiate based on the merit of their technical, financial and other bargaining strengths. As experience shows, technology transfers were mostly in the form of transfer of engineering skills for production of non-critical items, with foreign vendors not parting with critical components. Besides, as foreign companies were more interested in supplying items directly from their own domestic production centres, they were not compelled to form partnerships with Indian companies.

Acknowledging the above deficiency in the procurement procedure, the amendment has rightly introduced a new category called ‘Buy & Make (Indian)’. Under this new category, a supply order will be placed only on capable Indian companies who in turn will have to negotiate with interested foreign companies for technical and other production arrangement. This will give Indian companies an opportunity to explore a combination of alternatives, the best of which will be selected by the MoD. At the same time, foreign companies, which would play an indirect role under the new provision, would be compelled to set up joint venture with Indian companies, for a simple reason that it is only through the JV that they can sell their products. To obviate the possibility of Indian companies becoming a trading centre for foreign companies, the MoD has rightly mandated that the indigenous content, in value terms, of the product supplied under the new category should be at least 50 per cent. This would ensure that only serious Indian players with a long term vision of becoming true defence manufactures come into the business.

The second amendment vis-à-vis enhancing domestic defence production relates to information sharing with Indian industry. Earlier, Indian companies, especially private players, were constrained in terms of not having their advance R&D, production, financial and managerial plans, given the absence of information contained in the long term requirement plans of the armed forces. Now with the Indian government deciding to ‘widely publicise’ a public version of the Long Term Perspective Plan covering a 15 year technology perspective and capability roadmap of the defence forces, the Indian companies can have advance planning in their requisite strength areas. At the same time a window of interaction, opened via the amended DPP, will provide Indian companies and industry associations an opportunity to interact with and convince the acquisition functionaries that their products are superior compared to imported ones.

If the above amendments incentivise domestic companies to enter defence production, the government has also made it clear that it wants a competitive environment in defence industry. This has also been partly reflected in the amended Offset Policy which has been in force since 2005. The inclusion of an ‘Option Clause’ in the offset policy would henceforth allow foreign vendors to change offset partners – though not the offset component and value – midway through the contractual period in “exceptional cases”. The cases would however most likely arise when an Indian partner faults in its contractual promises. The clause would ensure that the company cannot take it for granted once it is selected as an offset partner. The fear of being replaced by another company in case of failure would not only put a question mark on its credibility, but will motivate it to improve its competitiveness to avoid eventual embarrassment.

The amendments to DPP 2008 augur well for the Indian defence industry. Considering that India’s cumulative defence procurement budget would be over $50 billion in the next five to six years, it provides tremendous opportunity for the industry. The industry now needs to have a firm plan, in terms of collaboration with foreign partners, investment in key areas of strength and also a strong resolve to make India truly self-reliant in defence production.

Amendments to DPP-2008

The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has recently announced certain amendments to the Defence Procurement Procedures 2008 (DPP 2008). The amendments which come into force from 1st November 2009, are intended to further promote the domestic industry to participate in defence production; streamline formulation of qualitative requirements; ensure greater transparency and accountability in defence procurement; and facilitate offset transactions.

There is a clear attempt to promote indigenous industry, a demand which is steadily being raised by the captains of both the public and private sector now.

For complete article see India Strategic, November 2009, http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories411.htm

May 27, 2009

Economic Downturn: Options for MoD

The present global economic crisis has slowed down the growth of the Indian economy, affecting among others, the fiscal situation and the revenue mobilisation potential of the central government. Defence being one of the largest recipients of central government expenditure, the present crisis casts a doubt on the adequacy of future resources. This commentary discusses some major options that India’s Ministry of Defence needs to consider in order to withstand the likely resource constraints in the coming years.

February 19, 2009

India’s Defence Budget 2009-10: An Assessment

In its interim budget for 2009-10 the Union Government has allocated Rs. 1,41,703 crores for the country’ Defence Services that include three Armed Forces (i.e., the Army, the Navy and the Air Force), and other Departments, primarily Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Defence Ordnance Factories. This is apart from Rs. 24,960 crores which have been earmarked to defray civil expenditures of Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its affiliated organisations, including, the Coast Guard, and for defence pension (Rs. 21,790 crores). In other words, the total resource available for the MoD and its various establishments is Rs. 1,66,663 crores. By convention, only budgetary provisions for the Defence Services constitute India’s defence budget.Though the allocations made in the interim budget are not binding for the next government to follow, it is unlikely that the new government will make any major changes in the allocation, given the mandatory increases in certain components of the defence budget, the worsening security situation in the country’s neighbourhood and the gap in the country’s defence preparedness. This commentary examines the various components of the defence budget, analyses the impact of the budget on the modernisation requirements of the Armed Forces, and the problem of under-utilisation of resources under the capital head.

January 31, 2009

India Needs a Liberal FDI Policy for its Defence Industry

Laxman Kumar Behera, India Strategic, January 2009

In early October 2008, the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) rejected a proposal of the Mahindra Defence Systems (MDS) – a special division of Mahindra and Mahindra (M&M) – to form a Joint Venture (JV) company in India with the UK’s largest and world’s fourth largest defence company, BAE Systems. The JV proposal, based on equity ownership of 51 per cent for MDS and 49 per cent for its British partner, was to “develop, manufacture and provide through life services support for Land Systems defence equipment” and reportedly envisaged a capital in.ow of over Rs. 55 crore.

The decision of the MoF can be termed unfortunate for several reasons.

Gorshkov Deal: India’s Helplessness with Russia*

By Laxman Kumar Behera

The Gorshkov deal between India and Russia has run into controversy over the price and cost overruns of the planned induction of the 44,500 tonne aircraft carrier into the Indian Navy. The Russian failure to adhere by contractual agreements also reveals India’s helplessness in regard to Russian military hardware. This article discusses key developments in the Gorshkov deal and the reasons for its being against India’s interests.

The deal goes back to 20 January 2004, when India signed the Contract and Supplementary Agreements worth US$974 million for inducting the Admiral Gorshkov into the Indian Navy. The agreements related to repair and re-equipment, logistics support, shore infrastructure, training of ship’s crew, repair and technical documents. The delivery of the carrier was scheduled for August 2008. However, as time elapsed, questions were raised over its timely delivery. But, the Indian establishment was assured that the ship would be delivered on the contractual terms.

November 8, 2008

India's Affordable Defence Spending

Defence expenditure is an important component of national security and every country allocates a significant portion of its resources for this purpose. However, given the scarcity of resources and the competing demands from other sectors, a nation’s ability to meet all its Defence requirements is not unlimited. Even the United States, the only military superpower, is unable to afford many of its major programmes, forcing it to scale down the number of items to be procured. The sheer size of the Defence budget and its impact on other sectors of the economy thus, more often raises the question as to how much a country can afford for its Defence.

For complete analysis see Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 1, Summer 2008, http://www.idsa.in/jds/2_1_2008_IndiaAffordableDefenceSpending_LKBehera

June 17, 2008

Tata’s Forays into Defence Production

In early May 2008 Tata Group of India and Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd (IAI) signed an agreement to establish a joint venture (JV) in India to develop, produce and support defence products such as missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems and homeland security (HLS) systems. The agreement is in sync with Tata’s broader objective of becoming a “lead system integrator” in the Indian private sector, by consolidating its own resources, diversifying into various fields of production and forging partnerships with major global defence companies. While Tata’s foray into defence production bodes well for the industry at large, it also has larger implications for state enterprises.
For complete article click http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/TatasForaysintoDefenceProduction_LKBehera_170608

February 28, 2008

The Great Indian Arms Bazaar*

By Laxman Kumar Behera

The DefExpo 2008, the fifth biennial defence exhibition on land and maritime systems held recently in New Delhi, conveyed most emphatically India's growing clout in the international arms bazaar, albeit mostly as a buyer. The exhibition, which saw a record 475 participants, including 273 foreign companies from over 30 countries, was in full swing for four days and had global biggies showcase the comparative advantages of their products. With India emerging as a major customer with considerable financial power, the global companies left no stone unturned to make India a partner in their ventures to access its huge arms bazaar.


Gone are the days when India, constrained by limited resources and Cold War politics, depended significantly on the single-source, 'cheap' Soviet-era weaponry for its armoury. With the end of Cold War and the global political realignment, especially post-9/11, Indian security requirements are no longer viewed adversely by the West. The impressive growth story of the Indian economy and its global character have favourably moulded the West's perception of India, which increasingly sees its security interests broadening as the economy goes global. Indian policy makers, for the first time, feel an urgency to protect the country's economic interests through a concomitant enhancement of its military might. This is reflected by the continuous upward movement in recent years of India's defence and more importantly modernisation expenditure on its armed forces. The modernization drive of the security infrastructure, backed by the country's ability to pay, has seen India spending more than Rs. 80,000 crore on procurement of defence items in the last three years. Besides, if all future plans materialize then the total procurement budget would amount to a whopping Rs. 1,88,000 crore in the next five years. The huge potential of the Indian arms market is what makes it attractive to global companies who are constrained by shrinking defence spending in their domestic markets.

January 10, 2008

Private Sector Participation in Indian Defence Industry

India opened up its defence industry to the private sector in May 2001, in a move to enhance the country’s ‘defence preparedness’. To give further impetus to this policy, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) came out with new policy measure related to the concepts of private Industry Leaders [or Raksha Udyog Ratnas (RURs)] “Make” procedure, and defence offsets, in its 2006 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). With these policy initiatives, the government’s focus seems to have shifted towards the private sector as far as achieving its long-cherished goal of ‘self-reliance’ is concerned.
For complete article click http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/PrivateSectorParticipationinIndianDefenceIndustry_LKBehera_080108

August 4, 2007

Indian Defence Acquisition: Time for Change

The latest Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) Performance Report on Defence Services (No. 4 of 2007) has once again exposed the problems involved in Indian defence acquisition. The report has been critical virtually of all the processes of the acquisition cycle, from planning to the formulation of Qualitative Requirements (QRs), vendor selection, conduct of trial and evaluations and processes of induction. It is in this perspective that a close examination is needed to get into the genesis of the problems and come out with an alternative solution that promotes efficient acquisition, which is moreover in tune with the best international practices.